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In the Supreme Court of the United States 
OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 
No. 1161. 
JOHN W. TERRY, et al., 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
STATE OF o:mo, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices 
of the Su.preme Cou.rt of the United States: 
OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION. 
There is no substantial federal question involved 
which would require this Court to review this case. 
The questions herein presented were raised both in 
the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and the 
Supreme Court of Ohio. The Court .of Appeals affirmed 
in an opinion reported as State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. (2d) 
122; 214 N. E. (2d) 114; 34 0. 0. (2d) 237. The Ohio 
Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. 
The Ohio courts decided this case in accordance with 
the statutes of the State of Ohio and in accordance with 
the Constitution of the United States and the applicable 
decisions of this Court. There is therefore no substantial 
federal question involved. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED. 
The respondent cannot subscribe to the questions 
presented by counsel for appellant and amicus. Their 
questions are taken out of context and present a distorted 
impression of the facts in the record. They then assume 
incorrect conclusions of fact and fix them in a basic 
premise and follow with an incorrect conclusion. 
The respondent submits that the following questions 
are presented in this case: 
I. Can the protection guaranteed to individuals by 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States be said to encompass any abso-
lute right irrespective of such restraints as the safety and 
welfare of the public may require? 
II. Is the exercise of "stop and frisk" based on prob-
able cause a right of society inuring to the benefit of an 
agent for society (the police officer) in establishing law 
and order and protecting the welfare and safety of so-
ciety? 
III. Does the decision of the Court of Appeals, Eighth 
Appellate District of Ohio, upholding the search and 
seizure, contravene the federal constitutional standards of 
reasonableness prescribed by the Fourth Amendment? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
John W. Terry and Richard D. Chilton, the peti-
tioners, were indicted on a charge of carrying a concealed 
weapon, in violation of Section 2923.01 of the Revised 
Code of Ohio. (See petition Appendix E, page 35.) A 
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence was overruled, 
and, upon a plea of not guilty, the court, sitting without a 
jury, returned a verdict of guilty as to both defendants. 
The relevant facts are as follows: At approximately 
2:30 p.m. of October 31, 1963, a Cleveland detective witL\ 
39 years and 4 months police experience observed two 
men, later identified as John W. Terry and Richard D. 
Chilton, engaged in behavior, on the comer of East 14th 
Street and Euclid Avenue (in downtown Cleveland), 
which immediately attracted his attention and aroused his 
suspicions. Positioning himself across the street he ob-
served these men for approximately ten to twelve minutes. 
One remained at the comer, the other walked several 
hundred feet up the street, peered into the window of 
either a diamond store or an airline office and then re-
turned to the corner to converse with the other. In turn 
the other person would leave the comer, repeat these ac-
tions and return to the comer. This procedure was re-
peated at least two to five times by each man. During this 
period, a third man, later identified as Carl Katz, ap-
proached the corner, spoke briefly with the two men, de-
parted and stationed himself across the street. The two 
men resumed their pattern of conduct, each making four 
to six trips. The two men then proceeded west on Euclid 
and at 1120 Euclid Avenue where they encountered the 
third male who was positioned there, and who had spoken 
with them previously. The detective testified: "* * * I 
didn't like their actions on Huron Road, and I suspected 
them of casing a job, a stick-up * * *" (R. 42) . 
. 2s 
4 
With this belief in mind, the detective approached 
the three men, who were engaged in conversation, identi-
fied himself as .a police officer, and asked for their names. 
Receiving only a mumbled, incoherent response by one or 
all (R. 28), the officer took hold of one (later identified as 
Terry), and turned him around in front of the officer 
facing the other two. He then patted Terry, the man in 
front of him. At no time did his hands reach into any 
pockets (R. 29-30). In patting Terry, in the upper left 
pocket of the top coat the officer felt a gun (R. 29). At this 
point the detective ordered the three men from the street 
to the interior of a nearby store. Retaining the appellant 
Terry by the collar of his coat he ordered all three to face 
the wall and place the palms of their hands against the 
wall. The detective then pulled the coat by the collar, 
from the rear to the shoulders of Terry, exposing in the 
upper left inside coat pocket a concealed revolver. The 
gun was removed by the detective. Subsequent examina-
tion proved it to be loaded. The officer proceeded to "pat 
down on the outside of his clothing" the second man, 
Chilton. He then felt an object in the left overcoat pocket 
which felt like a gun. He inserted his hand and removed 
a fully loaded revolver. A similar "patting down" of Katz 
revealed nothing. The three men were then taken to the 
police station where Terry and Chilton were charged with 
Carrying Concealed Weapons. 
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LAW AND ARGUMENT. 
Preliminary Statement. 
Through a long series of landmark decisions, lawyers 
and society have in the past years witnessed an affi.rmance 
of basic principles and rights in the area of criminal law. 
The reintroduction and affirmance of these rights into the 
American scene have been interpreted by many as irrev-
ocably altering the face and character of society. The 
significance of these decisions and their contribution 
toward our legal and social progress in the intervening 
years is beyond question, but as with every major innova-
tion, these decisions carry with them an inherent potential 
for misinterpretation, misuse and abuse on the part of 
some individuals and organizations, however good their 
intentions may be. 
Realizing that the future of our Nation must rest on 
the shoulders of her patriotic, law-abiding citizens and on 
laws that protect the individual rights of those citizens, 
laws that protect a free society where those citizens live, 
and a fair and impartial administration of all those laws 
by the courts, and although we stand with others against 
those who seek to deprive or limit that patriotic law abid-
ing citizen of any of his basic rights, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution and reintroduced by the many landmark de-
cisions, it is our position that the shield of these rights 
should be used as such and not as a weapon by those who 
in zealous application (deliberately or innocently) who 
would misuse, misinterpret, or abuse them. We stand not 
only for the protection of individual rights, but also the 
rights of society to protection from evildoers. No right 
under the Constitution is so absolute or self operating that 
it can be permitted to conduct a bleeding operation on the 
very society which has given it birth and nourishment. 
6 
This is basically what is being requested by these who 
would have the Court overturn the decision which is the 
subject of review in this case. 
It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that every 
frisking or patting down of any individual whom the police 
have detained for questioning is an invasion of the right 
to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
irrespective of the "unreasonable" test. It is their con-
tention that the Fourth Amendment guarantees the abso-
lute right of freedom from such action by law enforcement 
officers. 
The first question posed is then: 
I. Can the protection guaranteed to individuals by the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States be said to encompass any 
absolute right irrespeciive· of such restraints as the 
safety and welfare of the public may require? 
The answer is found in decisions of this Court con-
cerning the right of freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion. 
As early as 1890 in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 
the Court said, "* * * with man's relations to his Maker 
a.nd the obligations he may think they impose, and the 
manner in which an expression shall be made by him of 
his belief on these subjects, no interference can be per-
mitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to 
secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its 
people, are not interfered with. ::fiowever free exercise of 
religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal 
laws of the country, passed with reference to actions re-
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garded by general consent as properly the subject of puni-
tive legislation." 
The freedom of speech and of the press, which is 
secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute 
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever 
one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license 
that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and 
prevent the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 
Gitlam v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625. 
"The safeguarding and fructification of free and consti-
tutional institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon 
which the freedom of the press rest, and that freedom, 
therefore, does not and cannot be held to include the 
right to virtually destroy such ins~tutions; however com-
plete is the right of the press to state public things and dis-
cuss them, that right as every other right enjoyed in 
human society, is subject to the restraints which separate 
right from wrong doing." Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United 
States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560. 
The right of free speech is not an absolute one, and 
the state, in the exercise of its police power, may punish 
its abuse by those who indulge in utterances which incite 
to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of or-
ganized government by unlawful means. Strongberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532. 
Liberty of speech and of the press is not an absolute 
right, and the state may punish its abuse. Near v. Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625. 
12 
Thus we find from a long line of decisions that the law 
as it applies to question one has long been so well settled 
that it is unnecessary to do more than state it whenever 
the occasion arises. 
8 
It can therefore be assumed that the constitutional 
right to protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure is not absolute where the safety and welfare of the 
police officer and of the public are concerned. 
II. The exercise of "stop and frisk" based on probable 
cause is one of those restrictive limitations permitted 
to the state as circumscribing the provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment for the protection of the safety 
and welfare of the people. 
Such right must inure to the benefit of the people 
through their lawful agent, the police officer. 
"The right of freedom of speech and press * * * as 
every other right enjoyed in human society, is subject to 
the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing." 
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra. 
The state is necessarily invested with the police power 
which is the expression of the-popular conception of the 
necessities of social and economic conditions and under 
which may be done that which will best secure the peace, 
morals, health and safety of the community. Bloomfield 
v. State, 86 0. S. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L. R. A. (NS) 726, 
Am. Cas. 1913 D, 629 (affirming the Circuit Court, which 
affirmed, without opinion State v. Bloomfield, 13 N. P. 
(NS) 121) . 
The governmental body thus is given the right to act 
or limit individual rights of the constitution in the area of 
securing peace, morals, health and safety of the com-
munity. 
The Court of Appeals in rendering its opinion in the 
instant case has stated: 
"The right of the proper authorities to stop and 
question persons in suspicious circumstances has its 
333 
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roots in early English practice where it was approved 
by the courts and the common law commentators. 
See, 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 122, 129 (6th 
Ed. 1787): 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 89, 96-97 
(Amer. Ed. 1847): Lawrence vs. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 
14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C. P. 1810). Today, in several 
states, the authority of police officers to detain sus-
pects for a reasonable time for questioning is granted 
by statute. E.G., N. Y. Code of Crim. Pros., Sec. 180A 
(1965 Supp.): Gen. Laws of R. I., Sec. 12-7-1 (1956): 
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., Ch. 594, Sec. 2 (1955): 11 Del. 
Ann. Code, Sec. 1902 (1953): Warner, The Uniform 
Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942): Mass. Gen. 
Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 98 (1961). In others, the right is 
recognized by court decisions, E.g., People vs. Rivera, 
14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964): Gisske vs. Sanders, 9 Cal. 
App. 13 (1908): People vs. Fagenkrantz, 21 Ill (2d) 
75 (1961). 
The United States Supreme Court, however, has 
never squarely decided whether the police may con-
stitutionally stop and question a suspect without his 
consent in the absence of adequate grounds for ar-
rest. However, the lower federal courts permit such 
field interrogations. See, Henry vs. United States, 
361 U. S. 98, 106 (1959) (Clark, J. dissenting): 
Brinegar vs. U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 178 (1949) (Bur-
ton, J. concurring): Keiningham vs. United States, 
307 F. (2d) 632 (D. C. Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U. 
S. 948 (1963): Busby vs. United States, 296 F. (2d) 
328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 876 (1962). 
The cases also indicate that an officer may stop and 
question even though he has insufficient grounds to 
make an arrest. See, Ellis vs. United States, 264 F. 
(2d) 372 (D. C. Cir.), cert. den. 359 U.S. 998 (1959): 
United States vs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S. 
D. N. Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 
U. S. vs. Buffalino, 285 F. (2d) 408 (2d Cir. 1960), 
cited with approval in U. S. vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524, 
530 (2d Cir. 1961). 
10 
Admittedly there is some division of authority on 
the legality of the right to stop and question; however, 
the better view seems to be that the stopping and 
questioning of suspicious persons is not prohibited by 
the Constitution. See, Note, 50 Cornell L. Q. 529, 
533 (1965); United States vs. Vita, 294 F . (2d) 254 
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 823 (1962). Of 
great persuasive authority do we consider the long 
line of California cases, decided under the rule of 
People vs. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434 (1955) in which 
this practice has been upheld. E.g., People vs. Martin, 
46 Cal. (2d) 106 (1956); People vs. Simon, 45 Cal. 
(2d) 645 (1955); People vs. Jones, 176 Cal. App. (2d) 
265 (1959). Also of great persuasive authority is the 
recent New York Court of Appeals decision in People 
vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964) wherein this 
practice was also upheld. The courts of Ohio do not 
appear to have been squarely presented with this 
problem before. Therefore, we hold, in line with the 
great weight of authority, that a policeman may, un-
der appropriate circumstances such as exist in this 
case, reasonably inquire -of a person concerning his 
suspicious on-the-street behavior in the absence of 
reasonable grounds to arrest. 
An individual who acts in a suspicious manner 
invites a preliminary inquiry by the proper authority. 
It does not unreasonably invade the individual's right 
to privacy to hold that the price of indulgence in 
suspicious behavior is a police inquiry. See, Traynor, 
Mapp vs. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 
Duke L. J. 319 (1962). Such a minor interference 
with personal liberty would "touch the right of pri-
vacy only to serve it well." Traynor, supra, at p. 334. 
If such questioning failed to reveal probable cause, 
it would thereby forestall invalid arrests of innocent 
persons on inadequate cause and the attendant in-
vasion of personal liberty and reputation. If it re-
vealed probable cause, it would do no more than open 
the way to a valid arrest. The business of the police 
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is not only to solve crimes after they occur, but to 
prevent them from taking place whenever it is legally 
possible. As stated by the New York Court of Appeals 
in the recent case of People vs. Rivera, supra, at p. 
444: 
'The authority of the police to stop defendant 
and question him in the circumstances is perfectly 
clear. * * * Promr4: inquiry into suspicious or un-
usual street action is an indispensable police power 
in the orderly government of large urban commu-
nities. It is a prime function of city police to be 
alert to things going wrong in ·the streets; if they 
were denied the right to such summary inquiry, a 
normal power and a necessary duty would be 
closed off.' 
Admittedly, this power to inquire may be abused. 
But the possibility of some future infraction should 
not require that the police should now be made 
powerless to make reasonable inquiries into suspicious 
behavior. If such abuses arise, we shall deal with 
them when the time comes. However, for the present, 
we hold that under the facts of this case, the detective's 
inquiry was reasonable under the conditions pre-
sented." 
It is well settled that there is nothing ipso facto un-
constitutional in the brief detention of citizens under cir-
cumstances not justifying an arrest, for purpose of limited 
inquiry in the cause of routine police investigations. Rios 
v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 
2d 1688 (1960); Busby v. United States, 296 F. 2d 328 (9th 
Cir. 1961). 
The local policeman, in addition to having a duty to 
enforce the criminal laws of his jurisdiction, is also in a 
very real sense a guardian of the public peace and he has 
a duty in the course of his work to be alert for suspicious 
circumstances, and, provided that he acts within consti-
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tutional limits, to investigate whenever such circumstances 
indicate to him that he should do so. Frye v. U. S., 315 
F. 2d 491 at 494 (9th Cir. 1963). 
While the constitutional prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures makes no distinction be-
tween informal detention without cause and formal arrest 
without cause, there is a difference between that cause 
which will justify informal detention short of arrest and 
the probable cause required to justify that kind of custody 
traditionally denominated an arrest. Wilson vs. Porter, 
361 F. 2d 412. 
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective 
law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, in-
formal detention be recognized whenever it appears from 
totality of circumstances that the detaining officers could 
have had reasonable grounds for their action, and a 
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, that is, some 
basis from which the court can determine that detention 
was not arbitrary or harassing. Wilson v. Porter, supra. 
When the detention of defendant by police, initially 
for purpose of investigating his identity, became an arrest 
was to be determined under state law subject to such min-
imum constitutional standards as the United States Su-
preme Court had prescribed. Wilson v. Porter, su.pTa. 
Here upon the discovery of the revolver the police 
were confronted with a felony. (Ohio Revised Code 2923.-
01.) For this there was probable cause to arrest. Common-
wealth v. Ballow, Jr.: 217 N. E. 2d 187 (1966). Common-
wealth v . Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 404, 95 N. E. 868. Com-
monwealth v. Holmes, 344 Mass. 524, 525, 183 N. E. 2d 
279; People v. Mickel.son, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 451, 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 18, 380 P. 2d 658 and cases cited. People v. Rivera, 
14 N. Y. 2d 441, 447, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 201 N. E. 2d 
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32, cert. den. sub nom. RiveTa, v. N. Y., 379 U.S. 978, 85 
S. Ct. 679, 13 L. ed. 2d 568. 
The test to be applied in determining whether search 
and seizure is unreasonable is whether the thing done, 
in sum of its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect, 
impresses as being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable 
in the specific situation when the immediate end sought is 
considered against the private right affected. State v. 
Hagan, 137 N. W. 2d 895. United States v. Haskins, D. C. 
E. D. Tenn. 1962, 213 F. Supp. 551; United States v. Cook, 
D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1962, 213 F. Supp. 568; Schwimmer v. 
U.S., C. A. 8th (1956), 232 F. 2d 855, cert. den. 352 U.S. 
833, 77 S. Ct. 48, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 52. 
Presence of automobiles near scene of crimes under 
suspicious circumstances, however slight, imposes upon 
police the duty to stop and question the occupants, in-
spect or search them, and remove incriminating evidence 
found therein. To hold otherwise would make a farce 
of the police protection to which all citizens are entitled. 
State ex rel. Ogg v. Iahash, 140 N. W. 2d 692. 
In State v . Herdman, 130 N. W. 2d 628, the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota uses the following language. 
8 
"In the argument before this court it appears to 
be the claim of the defendant that the evidence used 
against him was the product of an exploratory search 
without probable cause in violation of his rights under 
the 4th and 14th Amendments. It seems to be further 
urged that since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. 
Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, police officers are not per-
mitted to accost a suspicious character on a public 
street for questioning. While the Mapp case and 
numerous decisions recently handed down by the 
United States Supreme Court clearly establish that 
under state and federal procedure citizens are en-
titled to uniform protection from unreasonable 
14 
searches and seizures, we do not understand that 
these decisions have gone so far as to require or sug-
gest that state police officers follow precise procedures 
in making arrests, searches and seizures. The Fourth 
Amendment protects the individual only from 'un-
reasonable' searches and seizures; and whether a 
search and seizure is 'unreasonable' must depend 
upon the particular facts of each case. 
"Nor do we feel that the legality of the arrest of 
defendant is tainted because the police officers ac-
costed and interviewed defendant without actual in-
formation that he was carrying stolen property in his 
automobile. Under the circumstances here, the po-
lice officers did no more than what they were required 
to do in performance of their duties. * * * 
"Persons found under suspicious circumstances 
are not clothed with a right of privacy which pre-
vents police officers from inquiring as to their identity 
and actions. The essential needs of public safety per-
mit police officers to use the faculties of observation 
and to act thereon within proper limits." 
To justify the seizure of a weapon which could be used 
against the arresting officer we shall not draw a fine line 
measuring the possible risk to the officer's safety. The 
officer should be permitted to take every reasonable pre-
caution to safeguard his life in the process of making the 
arrest. State vs. Riley, 402 P. 2d 741 (1965) . 
Circumstances short of probable cause to make an 
arrest may still justify officers stopping pedestrians or 
motorists on streets for questioning, and if circumstances 
warrant, officer may, in self-protection, superfically search 
suspect for concealed weapons, and should investigation 
then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, officer may 
arrest suspect and conduct reasonable search incidental 
thereto. People v. Jliachel, 44 Cal. Rpts. 126 (1965) . 
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While rule permitting temporary detention for ques-
tioning is operative under circumstances short of probable 
cause to make an arrest, there must exist some suspicious 
or unusual circumstance to authorize even this limited 
invasion of citizen's privacy. People v. Machel, supra. 
Reasonable investigatory techniques may be pursued 
by police indoors as well as outdoors, and it is not unrea-
sonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or 
witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for such 
purpose. People v. Machel, supra. 
Generally police officers may detain and question 
persons when circumstances are such as would indicate to 
reasonable man in a like position that such course is neces-
sary to proper discharge of duty. People v . Machel, supra. 
Reasonable search without warrant is valid where 
it is incidental to lawful arrest, and a seizure during such 
a search of evidence used in commission of crime for which 
arrest is made is permissible. People v . Machel, supra. 
"Reasonable Cause" had been generally defined to be 
such state of facts as would lead man of ordinary care and 
prudence to believe and consciously entertain an honest 
and strong suspicion that person is guilty of crime. People 
v . Machel, supra. 
Question of probable cause to justify defendant's ar-
rest and search must be tested on facts which records 
show were known to officers at time arrest was made. 
Supra. Also People v. Hernandez, 40 Cal. Repts. 100. 
"The right of police to investigate gives r ise to right 
to conduct reasonable search for weapons in order to pro-
tect safety of officer." People v. Garrett, 4 7 Cal. Rpts. 731 
(1966). 
The rule that circumstances short of probable cause to 
make an arrest may still justify an officer stopping pedes-
trians or motorists on the street for questioning does not 
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conflict with United States Constitution, Fourth Amend-
ment forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, but 
strikes a balance between a person's interest in immunity 
from police interference and the community's interest in 
law enforcement, and wards off pressure to equate reason-
able cause to investigate with reasonable cause to arrest, 
thus protecting the innocent from the risk of arrest when 
no more than reasonable investigation is justified. People 
v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. Rpts. 2d 448 (1963). 
If we recognize the authority of the police to stop an 
individual and inquire concerning unusual street events 
(U. S. v . Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 530: People v. Marendi, 213 
- N. Y. 600, 609; in a similar direction, U. S. v. Bonamo, 
180 F. Supp. 71, 81, 83, which although reversed on other 
grounds sub nom. U. S. v. Buja.lino, 285 F. 2d 410, was 
cited on this point with approval in Vita at page 530), we 
are required to recognize the hazards involved in this kind 
of public duty. The answer to the question propounded by 
the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure 
to danger and the safety and welfare of the officer (the 
public's interest) could be very great. The -frisk for 
weapons is a reasonable and constitutionally permissible 
precaution to minimize that danger in the interest of 
safety and welfare. 
We ought not, in deciding what is reasonable, close 
our eyes to the actualities of street dangers encountered 
in performing this kind of public duty. 
We submit, therefore, that the "stop and frisk" (for 
weapons) based on probable cause is constitutionally 
permissible as inuring to the benefit of an agent for so-
ciety (the policeman) in establishing law and order and 
protecting the interest (safety and welfare) of society. 
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ID. The decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, 
which the petitioner is seeking to have this Court 
overturn, does not contravene federal constitutional 
standards of reasonableness prescribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The search most commonly made by law enforcement 
officers and the subject of the petitioners' complaint herein 
is that of the person of the accused whom the officer had 
arrested. Searches of the person, if made, must conform 
to federal constitutional standards. The Fourth Amend-
ment provides, in part, that: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated * * *." 
A person may be searched by a search warrant, al-
though this method is seldom used. The vast majority of 
searches of the person are made incidental to lawful ar-
rests. It is the law on this question of search with which 
we will deal. 
The English and American law has always recognized 
the right on the part of the government to search the per-
son of the accused when legally arrested. Weeks v. U. S., 
232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914); Abel v. U. S., 362 U. S. 217 
(1960). 
"The law on this subject has long been so well 
settled that it is useless to do more than state it when-
ever the occasion arises." Lefkowitz v. U.S. Attorney, 
52 F. 2d 52 (1931), aff. 285 U.S. 452. 
The right to search applies to arrests for misde-
meanors as well as to those for felonies, U. S. v. Snyde-r, 
278 F . 650 (1922); Davis v. U. S., 328 U. S. 582 (1946) 
assuming an arrest in the full sense of the term. 
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The legal basis of the right to search is given by law 
to the arresting officer for three reasons: 
1. to protect the officer against harm; 
2. to deprive the prisoner of potential means of 
escape; and 
3. to prevent destruction of evidence by the arrested 
person. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in U. S. v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Abel v. U. S., supra at 236. 
If the arrest of the person is unlawful, any subsequent 
search made incidental to arrest is unreasonable. U. S. v. 
DiRe, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Brandon v. U. S., 270 F. 2d 
311 (1959), Note 5, cert. den. 362 U. S. 943; Bynus v. 
U. S., 262 U. S. 465; Williams v. U. S., 237 F. 2d 789 
(1956). 
No matter how valid the arrest may be in a technical 
sense, if the court finds that it was used by the officers 
simply as a pretext to make a search of the person, the 
search is unreasonable. Taglavore v. U. S., 291 F. 2d 262 
(1961). "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search 
for evidence." U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). 
The search of the person, incidental to arrest should 
be made by one or more of the arresting officers. U.S. v. 
Grieco, 25 F. R. D. 58 (1960). 
The officer's right to make a search of the person in-
cidental to arrest being predicated upon the arrest, the 
search must follow the arrest, not precede it. White v. 
U. S., 271 F. 2d 829 (1959); U. S. v. Hamn, 163 F. Supp. 
4 (1958). 
At this point the distinction made by the trial court 
and the appellate court comes into this case. It is sub-
mitted that the foregoing rule in the White and Hamn 
cases and the decision in the Mapp case will not outlaw 
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a state officer's frisking or even a search of the person 
made prior to arrest. Under the Uniform Arrest Act, 
adopted with modifications in Delaware, New Hampshire 
and Rhode Island, "a peace officer may search for a danger-
ous weapon any person whom he has stopped or detained 
to question as provided in Section 2, whenever he has rea-
sonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person 
possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer :finds a 
weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of 
the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest 
the person." The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Virginia Law 
Review 315 at 344 (1942) . 
. The petitioners argue, of course, that a frisking is a 
search in the full meaning of that term. The frisk as it is 
described in the actual events that occurred in this case, 
however, and as it is generally understood in police usage, 
is a contact or patting of the outer clothing of a person to 
detect by the sense of touch if a concealed weapon is being 
carried. The frisk is less such an invasion of the person 
in degree than an initial full search of the person would 
be. It ought to be distinguishable also on pragmatic 
grounds from the degree of constitutional protection that 
would surround a full-blown search of the person. 
This is exactly the distinction the trial judge made: 
"The constitutional restriction is against unrea-
sonable searches; not against all searches. And what 
is reasonable always involves a balancing of interest: 
here the security of the public order and the lives of 
the police are to be weighed against a minor incon-
venience and petty indignity. A similar police pro-
cedure has long been sustained in California." Peo-
ple v . Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106 (1956). 
As the Court of Appeals noted, a State is not precluded 
from developing :workable rules governing searches to 
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meet the practical demands of effective criminal investiga-
tions on law enforcement if the state does not violate the 
constitutional standard of what is reasonable. Ker v. 
Calif., 374 U. S. 23, 34, 31 LW 4611. 
It is therefore urged that the issue raised by the peti-
tion for certiorari has been effectively disposed of in the 
decisions of the Ohio courts sustaining the legal authority 
of a police officer to stop and question persons upon some 
probable cause and, if need be, to frisk for weapons to in-
sure the protection of the officer and the safety and wel-
fare of the community. 
It is argued by the petitioners that the trial court 
made a finding that the arrest was unlawful and that after 
making such a finding of illegal arrest the court should 
have suppressed the evidence. We cannot agree with this. 
The trial court never held that these men were illegally 
arrested in this case. The court merely said that had the 
arrests preceded the frisking of the men, such arrests 
would then have been illegal. The court then delineated 
the distinction between "frisking" as commonly practiced 
by police officers when they stop a suspect and the search 
of the person incident to arrest. 
If we accept the law of "stop and frisk" as a benefit 
to society in the interest of safety and welfare, the sub-
sequent factual situation must be looked into in the light 
of that law to establish whether we have a legal arrest and 
a search incident thereto. 
There appears to be no question but that the trial 
judge, defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney all 
agree that up to the point the petitioners were frisked by 
the detective probable cause for an arrest did not exist. 
Petitioners contend that the arrest occurred when the men 
were stopped notwithstanding the decision of the Court of 
Appeals that the stopping did not constitute an arrest. 
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What, then, was in the mind of the officer after he 
had observed the activities of the petitioners which led 
him to conclude that they were "casing a place for a stick-
up"? From the testimony it can only be concluded that the 
officer approached the three men solely for the purpose of 
routine interrogation and had no intention of detaining 
them beyond the momentary requirements of that mis-
sion. Upon identifying himself as a police officer and ask-
ing them their names and their responding by muttering 
something incomprehensible, coupled with his conclusions 
made from his prior observations ("they were casing a 
job, a stick-up"), the officer was confronted with only one 
course of action to a good police officer. Frisk for weapons 
for protection of his own life. "I wanted to see if they had 
any guns." (R. 137.) To this point in our facts there is 
no basis for an arrest. Had the officer frisked and found 
nothing there would have been no grounds for an arrest. 
The officer while frisking, through his sense of touch 
felt a bulge in the upper left breast pocket which he de-
cided was a gun. We must at this point recall that 
here is an officer with thirty-nine years experience and 
training, who has had countless opportunities to recognize 
the presence of weapons concealed under a suspect's 
clothing. Applying this to the observations of these men 
which he had made previously, the only intelligent con-
clusion that a trained police officer could make was that 
the defendant was at that time committing a felony in 
the presence of the officer by carrying a concealed weapon. 
To this point there has been no arrest, no search. Arrest 
followed immediately thereafter when the men were or-
dered to move inside the store and place their hands 
against the wall. Where there was no previous intent to 
detain, there is now; where there was no previous probable 
cause to arrest, there is now. The defendants are not free 
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to go at liberty. They were under arrest. Even though 
technical words of "you are under arrest" were not spoken, 
a valid arrest had been made. 
Arrest is to deprive a person of his liberty by legal 
authority. The seizing of a person and detaining him in 
the custody of the law. R. C. Section 2935.01, Bouvier's 
Law DictionaTy, Baldwin's Revision. 
An arrest in criminal law signifies the apprehension 
or detention of the person of another in order that he may 
be forthcoming to answer an alleged or supposed crime. 
5 0. Jur. 2d, Arrest Sec. 3. 
Arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the per-
son of another, either by touching or putting hands on 
him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take 
him into custody and subject the person to the actual con-
trol and will of the person making the arrest. 5 0. JuT. 20, 
Arrest Sec. 2, 57 0. Jur. 2d Words & Phrases 70. 
It was not until after the act of arresting these men 
that an actual search of their persons was made. 
Thus, here we have a lawful arrest after, not before, 
the frisk. The search of the person incidental to said 
arrest is therefore lawful. Weeks v. U. S ., s'llpra; Abel v . 
U. S., supTa; Lefkowitz v. U. S. Attorney, supra. 
In discussing all the facts and law pertaining to this 
case, in addition to the state's position being sustained by 
the law there is sound public policy reasons which dictate 
that the Court of Appeals' ruling should be upheld. As was 
indicated in the Rivera case, supra, "The business of the 
police is to prevent crime if they can. Prompt inquiry 
into suspicious or unusual street action is an indispensable 
police power in the orderly government of large urban 
communities. * * * if they were to be denied the right of 
such summary inquiry, a normal power and a necessary 
duty would be closed off." 
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A consideration of the law, public policy, and the 
interest of the community compels the conclusion that the 
conduct of the police was not violative of the federal con-
stitutional standards of reasonableness prescribed by the 
Fourth Amendment and that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals upholding such conduct properly applied such 
constitutional standards. 
Since there is no justiciable issue that has not been 
decided in accordance with applicable law, we respectfully 
submit that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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